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INTRODUCTION 
Take a quick glance at the magazine racks in any supermarket 
or convenience store, and the faces of celebrities, smiling or not, 
will stare right back at you.  Sign online and you will see these 
same faces on numerous gossip websites and blogs, which appear 
to be updated with new stories and photographs almost every two 
seconds.1  In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren observed, 
“[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds 
of propriety and decency.  Gossip is no longer the resource of the 
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued 
with industry as well as effrontery.”2  Never in their wildest 
dreams, or, more appropriately, nightmares, could Warren and 
Brandeis have imagined how large the gossip “trade” would grow. 
Today, the paparazzi go to unprecedented lengths to obtain 
photographs of celebrities that may be sold to the tabloids for an 
increasingly hefty compensation.3  In an effort to restrain the 
 1 See, e.g., US Weekly Online, http://www.usmagazine.com/blog/. 
 2 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
196 (1890). 
 3 See infra Part I. 
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paparazzi4 following recent incidents,5 California passed AB 381.  
California lawmakers justified the enactment of the new law on the 
ground that it is the only way to protect celebrities and the public 
from the paparazzi.  AB 381 would do this by eliminating the 
paparazzi’s economic incentive to go to extraordinary lengths to 
obtain photographs of celebrities.6  However, the United States 
Supreme Court has held laws that single out the press for 
differential treatment and target a specific portion of the media to 
be presumptively unconstitutional.7  The presumption may only be 
overcome by a showing that the law serves a compelling state 
interest that cannot be protected in the absence of the regulation.8  
The question therefore becomes: Are the protections of celebrity 
privacy and safety, as well as public safety, compelling state 
interests that justify the enactment of AB 381, a law that on its face 
subjects the press to differential treatment and specifically targets 
the paparazzi? 
This Note addresses the relationship between celebrity privacy 
rights, the press’s right to gather news, and the government’s 
ability to regulate this relationship through the enactment of 
legislation prohibiting so-called newsgathering torts.  Part I 
examines the history and policy surrounding celebrity privacy 
rights and anti-paparazzi legislation, including the events that 
prompted the enactment of AB 381.  Part II discusses the split 
among the courts regarding whether to impose liability for 
newsgathering torts.  Part III argues that the Fourth Circuit’s 
opinion in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. indicates 
that a law that imposes liability for newsgathering torts will not 
survive a constitutional challenge if the law singles out the press 
and specifically targets a limited portion of the media, unless the 
law serves a compelling state interest that cannot be protected in its 
absence.9  Part III also argues that AB 381 will not survive a 
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 See infra Part I. 
 6 See infra Part I. 
 7 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 
(1983). 
 8 Id. 
 9 194 F. 3d. 505, 520–22 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that reporters were liable in tort for 
employee disloyalty and trespass committed during the newsgathering process where the 
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constitutional challenge since (1) the law is discriminatory on its 
face and (2) it does not serve a compelling state interest because 
(a) current assault law provides an adequate remedy for outrageous 
paparazzi behavior, (b) the tabloids can police themselves, and (c) 
there is a limited market for pictures obtained through the use of 
dangerous tactics. 
I. FROM ROYALTY TO RODEO: THE HISTORY AND POLICY BEHIND 
AB 381 
When people think of the paparazzi, Princess Diana is one of 
the first names that comes to mind.  In August 1997, Princess 
Diana and her boyfriend Dodi Fayed were killed in a car accident, 
inside a Paris tunnel, while trying to elude a group of aggressive 
paparazzi.10  Princess Diana’s death prompted a worldwide 
backlash against the paparazzi and spawned a movement to 
prevent similar tragedies.11  Members of Congress proposed a 
number of bills to address the “paparazzi problem.”12  Despite 
such efforts, not a single one of the proposed federal bills reached 
the floor of the House of Representatives or the Senate for a vote.13  
Although efforts to pass anti-paparazzi legislation failed at the 
federal level, the State of California passed the nation’s first anti-
paparazzi statute in 1998.14
Nearly a decade after Princess Diana’s tragic death, the 
paparazzi have failed to refrain from their chases.  In May 2005, 
police arrested paparazzo Galo Ramirez on suspicion of assault 
with a deadly weapon after Ramirez rammed his car into Lindsay 
reporters secured jobs at a supermarket as a means to obtain information about the 
supermarket’s unwholesome food handling practices for use in a television broadcast). 
 10 See Richard J. Curry, Jr., Diana’s Law, Celebrity and the Paparazzi: The Continuing 
Search for a Solution¸ 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 946 (2000). 
 11 See id. (arguing that anti-paparazzi statutes are not necessary because existing laws 
effectively deal with abusive paparazzi behavior). 
 12 Id. at 948–51.  The bills proposed included the Protection from Personal Intrusion 
Act, the Privacy Protection Act of 1998, and the Personal Privacy Protection Act. Id. 
 13 Id. at 951. 
 14 Id. 
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Lohan’s Mercedes while attempting to capture her photograph.15  
In August 2005, Scarlett Johansson sideswiped a car while trying 
to elude four SUVs filled with paparazzi that had followed her for 
over an hour from her Hollywood home to Disneyland.16  She 
subsequently crashed into a vehicle carrying a woman and her two 
young daughters.17  Similarly, in September 2005, police cited 
photographer Todd Wallace for two misdemeanor counts of assault 
and battery after he assaulted two park employees while attempting 
to photograph Reese Witherspoon and her two children during 
their visit to Disneyland.18  Some argue that these recent incidents 
indicate that current laws fail to protect not only celebrities’ 
privacy, but the safety of celebrities and the general public as 
well.19
Spurred by the aforementioned incidents, on September 30, 
2005, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger approved AB 
381.20  AB 381 is an amendment to Section 1708.8 of the 
 15 Pamela McClintock, Governator Snaps Back at Paparazzi, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 3, 
2005, at 1.  In December 2005, the Los Angeles County District Attorney decided that 
there was insufficient evidence to charge Ramirez and thus dropped the charges. Rush, 
George and Joanna Rush Molloy, It’s a Lush Life: Celebs Recall How They Got Drunk 
With Success, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 30, 2005, at 28. 
 16 See That’s Hollywood; When Worlds Collide, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at B18. 
 17 See id. 
 18 Internet Movie Database, Witherspoon Explains Paparazzi Campaign (Nov. 1, 2005), 
http://www.imdb.com/news/wenn/2005-11-01.  Witherspoon stated, 
[t]hey do things that are illegal.  They’ve hit my car and tried to push me off the 
road.  And they’ve blocked me in with their cars, which is false imprisonment.  
They shout terrible obscene things at you and your children to try and get a 
reaction on your face.  I had one follow us to the pediatrician’s office shouting 
the f-word at us.  My daughter was only four—she was shaking and crying.  
It’s hard to live with.  And I don’t understand why it’s legal to print pictures of 
my children. 
Id. 
In February 2006, Todd Wallace was found dead in his Brentwood home.  He was never 
arraigned in the Witherspoon case. See Sarah Hall, Reese’s Theme Park Photog Believed 
Dead, EONLINE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,18304,00.html. 
 19 See Harrison Sheppard, Photos Finished?; Bill Would Target Paparazzi, DAILY 
NEWS OF L.A., July 24, 2005, at N1.  “The bill is a follow-up to a state law passed in 
1998—the year after Princess Diana was killed in a car crash following a chase by 
paparazzi—that targeted and spelled out similar penalties for photographers who trespass 
in pursuit of a photo.” Id. 
 20 2005 Cal. A.L.S. 424, 2005 Cal. AB 381, Stats. 2005 ch. 424. 
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California Civil Code.21  The law creates a cause of action against 
those persons who commit assault with the intent to capture any 
sort of visual image, sound recording or physical impression.22  
AB 381 provides that a person who commits such an assault is 
liable for up to three times the amount of general and special 
damages proximately caused by that violation and may also be 
liable for punitive damages.23  Furthermore, AB 381 provides that 
if the assault is proven to have been committed for a commercial 
purpose, any proceeds or consideration obtained as a result of that 
violation are subject to disgorgement to the plaintiff.24  AB 381 
also imposes liability on “[a] person who directs, solicits, actually 
induces or actually causes another person, regardless of whether 
 21 Id.; see Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 (2006).  This provision establishes two causes of 
action.  The first cause of action is for physical invasion of privacy which occurs when 
the 
defendant knowingly enters the land of another without permission or 
otherwise committed a trespass in order to physically invade the privacy of the 
plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial 
activity and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) (2006). 
The second cause of action is for constructive invasion of privacy which occurs when the 
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable 
person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression 
of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances 
in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use 
of a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a 
physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression 
could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory 
enhancing device was used. 
Id. at § 1708.8(b). 
 22 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (2006).  This provision prohibits “[a]n assault committed 
with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound recording or other physical 
impression of the plaintiff is subject to subdivisions (d), (e), and (h).” Id. 
 23 Id. at § 1708.8(d).  This provision establishes that 
[a] person who commits any act described in subdivision . . . (c) is liable for up 
to three times the amount of any general and special damages that are 
proximately caused by the violation of this section.  This person may also be 
liable for punitive damages, subject to proof according to Section 3294. 
Id. 
 24 Id.  This provision establishes that “[i]f the plaintiff proves that the invasion of 
privacy was committed for a commercial purpose, the defendant shall also be subject to 
disgorgement to the plaintiff of any proceeds or other consideration obtained as a result 
of the violation of this section.” 
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there is an employer-employee relationship,” to commit an assault 
with the intent to capture any sort of visual image, sound recording 
or physical impression.25  By enacting AB 381, the State of 
California sought to restrain the paparazzi by creating a 
disincentive for the paparazzi to go to extraordinary lengths to 
photograph celebrities.26
Whether in the traditional tabloids such as The National 
Enquirer or in “celebrity weeklies” such as Us Weekly, the market 
for paparazzi photographs continues to flourish.  With some 
paparazzi photographs selling for exorbitant amounts of money,27 
some argue that the only way to protect celebrities from the 
increasingly aggressive onslaught of the paparazzi is by 
eliminating the economic incentive for the paparazzi to take any 
means necessary to obtain the perfect picture.28  Nonetheless, 
 25 Id. at § 1708.8(e).  This provision establishes that 
[a] person who directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes another 
person, regardless of whether there is an employer-employee relationship to 
[commit an assault with the intent to capture a visual image, sound recording or 
other physical impression] is liable for any general, special, and consequential 
damages resulting from each said violation.  In addition, the person that directs, 
solicits, instigates, induces, or otherwise causes another person, regardless of 
whether there is an employer-employee relationship, to violate this section shall 
be liable for punitive damages. 
Id. 
 26 See 2005 Cal. A.L.S. 424, 2005 Cal. AB 381, Stats. 2005 ch. 424; AB 381 Bill 
Analysis, at 4, available at http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/analysis.html?file= 
ab_381_cfa_20050714_095213_sen_comm.html (last visited July. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 
AB 381 Bill Analysis].  Assemblywoman Cindy Montañez, the author of AB 381, wrote, 
[r]ecently, certain members of the press corps known as ‘paparazzi’ have taken 
their profession of capturing the images of celebrities in a dangerous direction: 
assaulting the celebrity in order to either capture the victim’s reaction to the 
assault on film or tape, or to use the threat of assault to impede the mobility of a 
celebrity so that an image may be taken. . . . And, the financial rewards of the 
‘right’ celebrity photo can be an incentive for the [paparazzi] to continue to 
push this trend. 
Id. 
 27 See Paparazzi Moments Over the Years, COX NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 31, 2005.  In 
2002, a bidding war erupted between Us and People magazines over pictures of Jennifer 
Lopez and Ben Affleck kissing.  People got the photos for $100,000. Id.  In 2004, a man 
getting married in the same Las Vegas chapel as Britney Spears and her childhood friend 
Jason Alexander takes pictures and sells them for $300,000. Id.  In 2005, pictures of Brad 
Pitt, Angelina Jolie and her son, Maddox, vacationing on a beach in Africa sold for 
$500,000. Id. 
 28 See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26, at 4. 
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despite the abundance of people who support AB 381, controversy 
persists as to whether a change in the law is necessary at all, and if 
it is, whether AB 381 is a reasonable solution.29
The incidents involving Lindsay Lohan, Scarlett Johansson and 
Reese Witherspoon reveal that the paparazzi’s actions can 
endanger celebrities, their companions and members of the general 
public, particularly those in California.30  Nonetheless, the 
incidents do not necessarily justify the creation of legislation that 
singles out the press and specifically targets the paparazzi.  To pass 
constitutional muster, AB 381 must serve a compelling state 
interest that cannot be achieved without the regulation.31  This 
standard is not easily satisfied. 
A. Is Anything Sacred?: Celebrity Privacy Rights under 
California Law 
AB 381 may override the presumption of unconstitutionality 
only if the law serves a compelling state interest that cannot be 
achieved without the regulation.32  Courts must therefore 
determine whether protecting celebrity privacy, celebrity safety 
and the safety of the general public are compelling state interests 
that cannot be protected in the absence of AB 381.  The courts 
continue to struggle with providing protection for personal privacy 
without infringing on the freedom of the press.33  As the Supreme 
Court of California stated in Shulman v. Group W Productions, 
Inc., “it has long been apparent that the desire for privacy must at 
many points give way before our right to know, and the news 
 29 See Parts I–II. 
 30 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 31 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 
(1983). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 477 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the 
broadcast of an accident victims’ rescue from a serious accident could not be the basis for 
tort liability under a private facts claim because it was newsworthy as a matter of law; 
that triable issues of fact existed as to whether reporters invaded a woman’s privacy when 
they accompanied her in the rescue helicopter and as to whether the reporters tortiously 
intruded into the woman’s privacy when they listened to confidential conversations with 
a nurse at the rescue scene, without the woman’s consent; and that members of the press 
did not have a First Amendment privilege to intrude on plaintiffs’ seclusion and private 
communications). 
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media’s right to investigate and relate, facts about the events and 
individuals of our time.”34  The conflict between personal privacy 
and freedom of the press fuels the controversy surrounding AB 
381. 
Over the years, both the federal and state courts have come to 
recognize the existence of a right to privacy.35  There are many 
different types of privacy laws, including, but not limited to, the 
common law tort,36 the constitutional right of privacy protecting 
rights to contraception37 and abortion,38 and other statutory rights 
of privacy that address specific privacy issues such as the use of 
personal data by the government.39  The privacy laws generally 
focus only on the common law tort.  However, because privacy 
jurisprudence developed alongside modern notions of free 
expression, privacy jurisprudence is heavily influenced by First 
Amendment theory.40  Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 
paparazzi’s First Amendment rights as members of the press 
greatly shape celebrities’ right to privacy under California common 
law. 
1. California’s Common Law Right to Privacy 
Celebrities argue that, like ordinary American citizens, they 
have a right to privacy that should be protected from invasion by 
the paparazzi.41  However, celebrities do not possess the same 
 34 Id. at 474. 
 35 Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to privacy implicit in the 
Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth 
Amendment’s right of people to be secure in their persons, the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment’s right to retain rights not 
enumerated in the Constitution); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931) (holding that the 
use of a woman’s name in a movie about her life was an invasion of her right of privacy 
guaranteed by the California Constitution); see Jamie E. Nordhaus, Celebrities’ Rights to 
Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go?, 18 REV. LITIG. 285, 287–88 
(1999). 
 36 See infra notes 42–45; MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 365–67 (7th ed. 
2005). 
 37 See Griswold, 112 Cal. App. 285. 
 38 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 39 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000). 
 40 See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 365–66. 
 41 See Liz Crokin, Chasing After Fame; Inside the Thrill, Mayhem of Photographing 
Celebs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2004, at 24.  Kirsten Dunst acknowledged her frustration 
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right to privacy as the average Joe (and not the average Joe who 
has become more than average due to a reality television role) 
because celebrities by trade throw themselves into the spotlight.42  
Some celebrities have a greater acceptance of the limits that fame 
places on their privacy.  George Clooney stated, “[i]t’s a tradeoff.  
You just have to sort of steel yourself when you go out and know 
that the walk to the market will be a more public event.”43
Whatever a particular celebrity’s perception of the paparazzi 
may be, celebrities undeniably do possess a right to privacy.  
California recognizes a common law right to privacy, which 
provides protection against four distinct categories of invasion as 
identified by Dean Prosser:44 (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;45 (2) public 
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff;46 (3) publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;47 and 
(4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.48  The common law right to privacy recognized 
by California, nevertheless, is far from absolute and remains 
subject to qualification, particularly in the case of celebrities and 
with the paparazzi’s intrusive behavior as she stated, “I don’t see how it can be a legal 
thing to just take pictures of people in their everyday life.” Id. 
 42 See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 289–92. 
 43 Liz Crokin, Chasing After Fame; Inside the Thrill, Mayhem of Photographing 
Celebs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2004, at 24. 
 44 FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 365. 
 45 Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharms., 86 Cal. App. 4th 365 (2001) (holding that a breast 
cancer patient had a sustainable cause of action for intrusion when the doctor allowed a 
drug salesman to stay in the room during the woman’s examination without informing the 
woman of the drug salesman occupation). 
 46 Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 64 Cal. App. 3d 825 (1976) (holding that a student’s 
complaint against a university for disclosure of prior college transcripts to a loan 
commission was a prima facie violation of the State’s constitutional right to privacy). 
 47 Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1983) (holding that a 
newspaper’s use of petitioner’s likeness to promote a false article could have infringed 
petitioner’s right of publicity because a California statute provided no exemption for 
publication of news known to be false). 
 48 Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1955) (holding that an 
invasion of a consumer’s right to privacy occurred when the seller of a product used the 
consumer’s name in a print advertisement without the consumer’s permission). 
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other public figures.49  Despite what Us Weekly may imply, 
celebrities are not just like us.50
2. The Newsworthiness Limitation 
A celebrity’s right to privacy is especially limited when that 
celebrity enters a public place,51 and it is upon entering a public 
place that the celebrity’s problems with the paparazzi arise.  
However, even things that occur behind closed doors may not 
qualify as private when they concern the lives of celebrities 
because when the subject matter is of legitimate public interest, 
courts limit an individual’s ability to bring a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy.52
In Kapellas v. Kofman, the Supreme Court of California 
outlined the factors to consider when determining whether a 
subject is newsworthy: (1) “the social value of the facts 
published,” (2) “the depth of the article’s intrusion into ostensibly 
private affairs,” and (3) “the extent to which the party voluntarily 
acceded to a position of public notoriety.”53  The court further 
explained that as the legitimate public interest in the published 
information became more “substantial,” greater intrusions into a 
person’s private life would be allowed.54  Nonetheless, while the 
Kapellas court acknowledged the factors that the court should 
 49 See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733 (1962) (holding that 
because the marriage of the defendant actress with the plaintiff and the later annulment 
were matters of public record there were no revelations of any intimate details which 
would tend to outrage public decency and therefore there was no cause of action for an 
invasion of his right of privacy). 
 50 Us Weekly contains a regular feature entitled “Stars—They’re Just Like Us.”  The 
feature typically contains pictures of celebrities engaged in everyday activities and 
looking far from glamorous.  See US Weekly Online, http://www.usmagazine.com/blog/ 
(click on “Quick Link” “Stars—They’re Just Like Us”). 
 51 See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 302–03. 
 52 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the cause of action for 
invasion of privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim imposed 
sanctions on pure expression, the content of a publication). 
 53 Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922–24 (Cal. 1969) (holding that a qualified First 
Amendment newsworthiness privilege did not apply to a libel claim brought against the 
publisher of an editorial that stated that a politician was not putting her children’s needs 
first and that her performance as a mother was less than adequate). 
 54 Id. at 922. 
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balance when determining a subject’s newsworthiness,55 the 
Shulman court made clear that the tastes or interests of an 
individual judge or juror do not determine newsworthiness.56  
According to the Shulman court, a subject is newsworthy so long 
as some reasonable members of the community could maintain a 
legitimate interest in it.57
Unfortunately for celebrities, “[o]ften, it is the intensely private 
aspects of a celebrity’s life—involving drugs, sex or sexual 
orientation, marital discord, issues with children or other family 
members, or similar topics—that the public and the media deem 
newsworthy.  (Illegality only ratchets up the stakes, and increases 
interest in the story.)”58  While some may believe that a celebrity’s 
sexual relationships or battles with addiction do not qualify as 
newsworthy, the courts have taken a different view.59  In Carlisle 
v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., the Court of Appeal of California 
acknowledged the existence of a public interest in the activities of 
celebrities.60  The court stated, 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998). 
 57 Id. at 485–86. 
 58 Julie Hilden, Does Celebrity Destroy Privacy? Naomi Campbell and Narcotics 
Anonymous, FINDLAW, Apr. 2, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/ 
20020402.html. 
 59 See Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423 (1983).  The 
court stated “[w]e have no doubt that the subject of the Enquirer article—the purported 
romantic involvements of Eastwood with other celebrities—is a matter of public concern, 
which would generally preclude the imposition of liability.” Id.  In Gilbert v. National 
Enquirer, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1149 (1996), the court reversed a preliminary 
injunction restraining Melissa Gilbert’s ex-husband from disclosing allegedly defamatory 
statements regarding Gilbert’s sexual relationships and substance abuse.  The court 
stated, 
[a]s we previously indicated, information concerning Gilbert’s personal life is 
newsworthy due to her celebrity status . . . . While Gilbert has not lost all of her 
privacy rights by virtue of attaining celebrity status, the media attention 
regarding her personal relationships has to some degree diminished the zone of 
privacy surrounding those relationships. 
Id. 
 60 See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 746 (1962).  The court 
stated, “there is a public interest which attaches to people who by their accomplishments, 
mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread 
attention to their activities.” Id. 
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[c]ertainly, the accomplishments and way of life of 
those who have achieved a marked reputation or 
notoriety by appearing before the public such as 
actors and actresses, professional athletes, public 
officers, noted inventors, explorers, war heroes, 
may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in 
print or on radio or television.  Such public figures 
have to some extent lost the right of privacy, and it 
is proper to go further in dealing with their lives and 
public activities than with those of entirely private 
persons.61
The Carlisle court suggested that a Faustian bargain exists—in 
exchange for life as a celebrity, one must surrender one’s right to 
privacy.62
B. Reality Bites: Existing California Law and the Motivation 
behind AB 381 
The paparazzi, and the members of the press in general, have 
much greater leeway when it comes to publishing and gathering 
information about celebrities’ lives as a result of jurisprudence that 
limits the ability to bring a cause of action for invasion of privacy 
when the issue concerns a matter of public interest.63  In addition 
to using judicial limits placed on privacy as a means to obtain 
information about the so-called private aspects of celebrities’ lives, 
the paparazzi have also hidden behind such limits when accused of 
overzealously pursuing celebrities and posing a danger to 
celebrities and the general public.  Privacy law, however, is not the 
only source of law that can protect celebrities from the paparazzi.  
 61 Id. at 746–47. 
 62 Id.; see Camrin L. Crisci, All the World Is Not a Stage: Finding a Right to Privacy in 
Existing and Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 207, 210 (2002).  
During the congressional hearings for the Personal Intrusion Act and the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998 Michael J. Fox stated, 
I work very hard to entertain an audience, and when they enjoy my work, I am 
deeply gratified. . . . I strongly disagree with those who would argue that some 
sort of Faustian bargain has been struck whereby ‘public’ figures are fair game, 
any time, any place, including within the confines of their own homes. 
Id. 
 63 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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Therefore, to determine whether AB 381 overcomes the 
presumption of unconstitutionality it is necessary to examine 
existing California law, including, but not limited to, privacy law, 
as well as the motivation for AB 381’s enactment. 
1. California Law—Assault, Trespass, Stalking and 
Harassment 
Supporters of AB 381 argue that recent incidents involving the 
paparazzi indicate that existing statutes and the common law 
provide celebrities with insufficient protection from the paparazzi 
while in public places.64  According to Assemblywoman Cindy 
Montañez, “rare instances may produce criminal charges due to the 
egregious nature of the assault, [but] many others go unpunished 
due to the difficulty of proving criminal assault.”65  In contrast, 
opponents argue that AB 381 is unnecessary because current 
assault law sufficiently protects celebrities from paparazzi who 
break the law while in pursuit of a photograph.66  As Peter Scheer, 
the executive director of the California First Amendment 
Coalition, stated, “[t]he behavior that’s described is an assault.  
And you can sue somebody right now for an assault, and 
somebody who assaults you can also be prosecuted.”67
California’s trespass, stalking, and harassment laws, while 
providing celebrities with protection against some predators, fail to 
protect celebrities from the paparazzi.68  Trespass laws do nothing 
to shield celebrities from the prying eyes of the paparazzi while on 
public property.69  California Civil Code Section 1708.7 creates a 
civil cause of action against stalking.  However, since California’s 
stalking law requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had 
“the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable fear for his or her 
safety, or the safety of an immediate family member,” the law does 
 64 See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 301–03. 
 65 See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26, at 4. 
 66 Harrison Sheppard, In the Sights of the Paparazzi: Assembly Bill Would Allow Stars 
to Sue Aggressive Photographers, CAL. FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, available at 
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/sue_paparazzi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 301–03. 
 69 Id. at 301. 
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not offer celebrities protection from the paparazzi because the 
paparazzi’s intent is to capture an image.70  California’s 
harassment statute eliminates the element of intent from stalking 
statutes.71  Nonetheless, the harassment statute contains its own 
loophole as the law covers only harassment that “serves no 
legitimate purpose.”72  Since newsgathering is a legitimate 
purpose, the harassment statute is unlikely to apply to the 
paparazzi.73
In the absence of provable criminal assault, celebrities have 
limited recourse against the paparazzi when in public places 
because, traditionally, courts have not considered the taking of an 
individual’s photograph in a public place to constitute an invasion 
of privacy.74  Courts take the position that a celebrity, or any 
person for that matter, effectively consents to the glare of the 
public eye upon entering a public place.  The photograph merely 
makes a record of that which is already public.75  Although 
California’s common law right to privacy, as well as the State’s 
trespass, stalking, and harassment laws, fail to protect celebrities 
 70 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); Nordhaus, supra 
note 35, at 302–03. 
 71 See Cal. Civ. Proc. § 527.6 (2005). 
 72 See id. at § 527.6(b); Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 303. 
 73 Nordhaus, supra note 35, at 303. 
 74 See generally Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953) (reversing 
defendant’s demurrer to an amended complaint that maintained that plaintiff’s cause of 
action must rest solely on the publication of photographs without reference to the 
accompanying text because the plaintiffs failed to make the allegation that defendant 
consented to the publication of the article); see also Phillip E. Hassman, Taking 
Unauthorized Photographs as Invasion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374, 378–81 (2005). 
 75 Gill, 253 P.2d at 443–45.  The court stated, 
the mere publication of the photograph standing alone does not constitute an 
actionable invasion of plaintiffs’ right of privacy. . . . The photograph of 
plaintiffs merely permitted other members of the public, who were not at 
plaintiffs’ place of business at the time it was taken, to see them as they had 
voluntarily exhibited themselves.  Consistent with their own voluntary 
assumption of this particular pose in a public place, plaintiffs’ right to privacy 
as to this photographed incident ceased and it in effect became a part of the 
public domain, as to which they could not later rescind their waiver in an 
attempt to assert a right of privacy.  In short, the photograph did not disclose 
anything which until then had been private, but rather only extended knowledge 
of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually 
witnessed it at the time of the occurrence. 
Id. 
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from the paparazzi while in public places, the paparazzi do not 
have carte blanche to assault celebrities while in pursuit of a 
photograph. 
2. Meritless Defense?: The Misguided Motive behind AB 381 
Proponents of AB 381 argue that the law will protect public 
safety and celebrity privacy by eliminating the economic incentive 
to go to dangerous lengths to obtain photographs of celebrities.76  
However, opponents believe that the State’s justification lacks 
merit because there is a limited market for photographs obtained 
through the use of dangerous tactics.77  Frank Griffin, a longtime 
celebrity photographer with Los Angeles-based Bauer-Griffin, 
implied that Assemblywoman Montañez’s view of the situation 
was somewhat misguided when he stated, “[y]ou’ve got this image 
of photographers driving around like Mad Max with big battering 
rams on their cars smashing into celebrities to take pictures of 
them. . . . It doesn’t make any sense.  It doesn’t happen in the real 
world.  It may happen in her (Montañez’s) imagination.”78  
According to Griffin, a paparazzo who crashes into a celebrity, or 
otherwise assaults a celebrity, while trying to capture the 
celebrity’s photograph will have difficulty selling the picture to a 
major magazine, and thus has a limited incentive to engage in 
dangerous and potentially harmful behavior.79
 76 Assemblywoman Montañez stated, “[t]his bill hits the paparazzi where it hurts—the 
wallet.  Money is their motivation, so taking away their money will be the solution.” 
Legislation That Puts a “Freeze-Frame” on Aggressive Paparazzi Signed by Governor, 
CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, Oct. 3, 2005, http://democrats.assembly. 
ca.gov/templates/ademmain.asp?articleid=293&zoneid=2. 
 77 Harrison Sheppard, In the Sights of the Paparazzi: Assembly Bill Would Allow Stars 
to Sue Aggressive Photographers, CAL. FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION, available at 
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/sue_paparazzi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).  Griffin 
stated, “[w]ho is going to buy the pictures of a celebrity having been crashed into by 
rampant photographers?” Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
Photographers who crash into a celebrity or otherwise assault them often have 
difficulty selling that picture to major magazines . . . so they have little 
financial incentive to engage in such behavior.  The incidents are also relatively 
rare. 
Id. 
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3. Self-Policing 
Opponents of the AB 381 also believe the law is unnecessary 
because the paparazzi and the tabloids can police themselves.  One 
tabloid in particular, Us Weekly, demonstrated its willingness to 
change the situation in Los Angeles by banning pictures from 
publication that were taken by photographers who “violated traffic 
laws, trespassed on private property or invaded the privacy of 
children at school.”80  If given the opportunity, other tabloids, as 
well as the paparazzi, may take a similar route.  This would make 
AB 381 a completely irrelevant statute. 
4. Crying Foul: AB 381 Provides Celebrities with Special 
Treatment 
Another argument against AB 381 is that the law provides 
celebrities with special treatment.  Frank Griffin questioned the 
motives for the law when he stated that “[t]his town lives off its 
celebrities. . . . I do think [Assemblywoman Montañez] is someone 
who is trying to climb on the bandwagon without doing proper 
research thinking this bill is going to attract campaign 
contributions from Paris Hilton and Angelina Jolie.”81  AB 381 
arguably provides celebrities with special treatment because the 
law establishes disparate damage remedies for celebrities, whom 
the paparazzi target, and the members of the general public who 
are simply the residual victims in accidents caused by paparazzi 
chases. 
Under AB 381, Scarlett Johannson could recover general and 
special damages from the paparazzo who caused her to side swipe 
another car, plus disgorgement of any profits received from the 
sale of photographs taken during the encounter.82  Ms. Johannson 
would also have a cause of action against the tabloid or agency that 
directed the paparazzo to take the photographs.83  However, the 
woman and her two young daughters, in the car Ms. Johannson hit, 
 80 Us Weekly to Ban Reckless Paparazzi Shots, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 14, 2005. 
 81 Jennifer Myers, Shuttering Paparazzi, 29 (3) NEWS MEDIA & THE L. 18, 2005 
WLNR 14952105, July 1, 2005. 
 82 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 83 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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would only be able to recover for damages caused by the car 
accident.84
The supporters of AB 381 tout public safety as a justification 
for the enactment of AB 381.85  Nonetheless, some believe that the 
unequal damage remedies available to the general public and to 
celebrities imply that the law is motivated more by the desire to 
garner celebrity favoritism through the further lining of celebrity 
pockets, and possible lining of supporting politicians’ coffers, than 
a desire to protect public safety.86  Assemblywoman Montañez 
acknowledged the fortuitousness of the circumstances when she 
stated, 
[t]here is no better situation than to have a Governor 
who can look at a bill and be an eyewitness—and 
personal witness—to exactly the crime that we’re 
going after. . . . [W]e’re happy that the Governor 
signed a law that would prevent future 
celebrities . . . from becoming victims the way he 
and his family were a couple years back.87
C. Chilling the First Amendment and Frivolous Lawsuits 
AB 381 creates further controversy because some believe that 
it will be used to chill the First Amendment and create frivolous 
lawsuits.  According to the California Newspapers Publishers 
Association, “[u]nder AB 381, newsworthy persons with a bone to 
pick with the press will file frivolous lawsuits against journalists 
and the newspapers that employ them in an attempt to chill the 
 84 See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 85 Bill Hodgeman of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, which supports AB 
381, stated, “[i]n certain instances the paparazzi photographers are violating California 
criminal laws and my overarching concern about that is given this sort of behavior it 
strikes me as inevitable that someone is going to get seriously hurt or killed.” Jennifer 
Myers, Shuttering Paparazzi, 29 (3) NEWS MEDIA & THE L. 18, 2005 WLNR 14952105, 
July 1, 2005. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Legislation That Puts a “Freeze-Frame” on Aggressive Paparazzi Signed by 
Governor, CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, Oct. 3, 2005, http://democrats. 
assembly.ca.gov/templates/ademmain.asp?articleid=293&zoneid=2. 
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public’s right to know.”88  Opponents argue that AB 381 will be 
wrongfully employed by celebrities against the paparazzi and the 
tabloids in an attempt to keep their names and faces off the racks at 
supermarkets.89  In addition, opponents argue that AB 381 
threatens the First Amendment rights of mainstream journalists 
because the law does not simply provide protections for celebrities 
against the paparazzi.90  Any individual involved in scandalous 
behavior will have every incentive to misuse the statute.91
II. TWO APPROACHES TO THE PRESS’S RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS 
The jurisprudence regarding newsgathering torts greatly affects 
the struggle to find a middle ground between celebrity privacy 
rights and the rights of the paparazzi.  Some courts take the 
approach that “the tort taints the speech,” and thus place limits on 
the press’s First Amendment right to gather news.92  Other courts 
take the approach that “the speech protects the tort,” and allow 
members of the press to hide behind the First Amendment in the 
event that tortious conduct occurs during the course of 
newsgathering.93  The approach taken by the California courts with 
regard to newsgathering torts may ultimately determine the fate of 
AB 381. 
 88 Letter from Thomas W. Newton, General Counsel, California Newpaper Publishers 
Association, to Cindy Montañez, California State Assembly, Aug. 3, 2005, available at 
http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/Letters/05-06/AB381.htm. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
News subjects involved in scandal, crime and government corruption have 
every incentive to interfere with the newsgathering process and the public’s 
right to know.  AB 381 would provide criminals and others in the spotlight with 
a powerful new tool to tie journalists and newspapers up in court in an attempt 
to stop public exposure of their behavior.  Essentially, AB 381 would create 
liability whenever a reporter gets too close to a news subject and appears to 
have the present ability to get even closer. 
Id. 
 92 See infra Part II.B. 
 93 See infra Part II.C. 
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A. The First Amendment Right to a Free Press 
The First Amendment declares the right to a free press.94  
Nonetheless, advocates of AB 381 argue that there should be limits 
on the means by which information may be gathered and that the 
paparazzi should not be permitted to use the First Amendment as a 
shield to protect dangerous and harmful behavior.95  The 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, however, does not 
disappear simply because the reporting involves the publication of 
a person’s name or likeness, potentially invading that person’s 
privacy.96  Instead, the law expands the press’s freedom to publish 
information when the person whose name or likeness the press 
seeks to publish is a celebrity.97  Privacy jurisprudence indicates 
that the paparazzi have every right to photograph celebrities 
driving down Robertson Boulevard and drunkenly stumbling 
outside the Roosevelt Hotel.98  Still, the paparazzi do not have a 
completely unrestricted right to gather information about 
celebrities simply by virtue of being members of the press.99
The First Amendment gives the press the right to inform the 
public about matters of legitimate public interest absent a 
compelling state interest to the contrary.100  Following this 
reasoning, if information about a celebrity’s life is a matter of 
 94 U.S. CONST. amend. I, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.” 
 95 See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26. 
 96 See Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 421–22 (1983).  
The court stated, 
[f]reedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, and the publication of 
daily news is an acceptable and necessary function in the life of the community.  
The scope of the privilege extends to almost all reporting of recent events even 
though it involves the publication of a purely private person’s name or likeness. 
Id. at 422. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See supra notes 68–73. 
 99 See infra Part III.A–B. 
 100 See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that the state 
interest in protecting the identity of a juvenile offender could not justify the statute’s 
imposition of criminal sanctions on the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile 
delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper).  The Court stated, “if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to 
further a state interest of the highest order.” Id. 
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legitimate public interest and no compelling state interest justifies 
the suppression of the information, then the First Amendment 
should protect the paparazzi’s right to inform the public about such 
a matter.  However, because the courts distinguish between the 
press’s right to publish news and the press’s right to gather news, 
and afford the right to publish news greater First Amendment 
protection, the right to inform the public does not equate to an 
unrestrained right to obtain information.101
B. The Tort Taints the Speech: Limiting the Press’s Right to 
Gather News 
Courts have recognized limits on the press’s right to gather 
news.102  The Dietemann court found that “[t]he First Amendment 
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts 
or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering.  The 
First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude 
by electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or 
office.”103  The rulings that recognize limits on the press’s right to 
gather news support imposing liability for newsgathering torts and 
imply that the “tort taints the . . . speech.”104
1. Federal Cases 
Courts have determined that newsmen may not violate 
generally applicable contract105 or tort laws106 in the name of the 
 101 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 496 (Cal. 1998).  The court 
stated, “the constitutional protection accorded newsgathering, if any, is far narrower than 
the protection surrounding the publication of truthful material; consequently, the fact that 
a reporter may be seeking ‘newsworthy’ material does not in itself privilege the 
investigatory activity.” Id. 
 102 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 
449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 103 Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. 
 104 See Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages For Newsgathering 
Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 
521–22 (1998) (arguing that the focus of the debate should not be on limiting media 
liability for newsgathering torts but instead should be on preventing the award of 
excessive damages for newsgathering torts).  “If the argument . . . is, in effect, that the 
speech should protect the tort, a contrary argument might be made that the tort ‘taints’ the 
ensuing speech, stripping it of First Amendment protection.” Id. 
 105 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 670. 
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First Amendment.  In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the United States 
Supreme Court held that an informer was entitled to receive 
compensatory damages from a publisher that breached its 
confidentiality agreement with the source under a theory of 
promissory estoppel.107  In Dietemann v. Time, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the First Amendment did not permit an individual to 
invade another’s home with a hidden camera and concealed 
electronic equipment simply because that individual was gathering 
news.108
The most famous case involving the paparazzi is Galella v. 
Onassis, in which Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis obtained an 
injunction against paparazzo Donald Galella after suing him for 
harassment.109  The Second Circuit upheld the injunction reasoning 
that while Jackie Onassis was a public figure, and therefore subject 
to news coverage, Galella’s “constant surveillance, his obtrusive 
and intruding presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable.”110  
The Second Circuit acknowledged the limits on the press’s right to 
gather news as well as the unique character of the paparazzi when 
it stated, “[r]elief must be tailored to protect Mrs. Onassis from the 
‘paparazzo’ attack which distinguishes Galella’s behavior from 
that of other photographers.”111  On the other hand, the court also 
recognized that the injunction must not be broader than required 
and should not “unnecessarily infringe on reasonable efforts to 
‘cover’ Jackie Onassis.”112  Not even American “royalty” could 
gain absolute protection from the prying eyes of the paparazzi. 
 106 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249. 
 107 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 672.  The Court stated, “generally applicable laws do 
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.” Id. at 669. 
 108 See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249, 252. 
 109 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 110 Id. at 995. 
 111 Id. at 998. 
 112 Id. 
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2. California Cases 
California courts have also recognized limits on the press’s 
right to gather news.113  In KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, an action 
against a television station for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, the Court of Appeal of California held that the First 
Amendment did not protect a television news reporter’s on-camera 
interview with three young children when, during the interview, 
the reporter informed the children that two of their playmates had 
been murdered by the playmates’ mother, who then committed 
suicide.114  The court explained, 
[i]f indeed defendant sought to elicit an emotional 
reaction from the minors for the voyeuristic 
titillation of KOVR-TV’s viewing audience, this is 
shameless exploitation of defenseless children, pure 
and simple, not the gathering of news which the 
public has a right to know.  A free press is not 
threatened by requiring its agents to operate within 
the bounds of basic decency.115
In Miller v. National Broadcasting Company, the Court of 
Appeal of California held that First Amendment protection for 
newsgathering did not immunize a television camera crew against 
a wife’s action for invasion of privacy by intrusion when the crew 
entered into her husband’s bedroom without consent during an 
extremely sensitive time, due to her husband’s heart seizure.116  
The court reasoned that, in this instance, the obligation not to enter 
private premises without permission did not place an 
impermissible burden on newsgatherers, nor was it likely to have a 
chilling effect on the First Amendment.117
 113 See KOVR-TV v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023 (1995); 
Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1986). 
 114 See KOVR-TV, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1027, 1032. 
 115 Id. at 1032. 
 116 See Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1469, 1484. 
 117 Id. at 1492–93.  The court stated, 
the obligation not to make unauthorized entry into the private premises of 
individuals like the Millers does not place an impermissible burden on 
newsgatherers, nor is it likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.  To hold otherwise might have extraordinarily chilling 
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C. The Speech Protects the Tort: Cases Protecting the Press’s 
Right to Gather News 
While both the federal courts and the California courts have 
held that the First Amendment does not shield newsmen from 
punishment for torts committed in the newsgathering process, one 
United States Supreme Court justice cautioned against 
distinguishing between the right to publish news and the right to 
gather news.  In his dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, Justice Stewart 
warned that “[n]o less important to the news dissemination process 
is the gathering of information.  News must not be unnecessarily 
cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the 
right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.”118  
Echoing Justice Stewart’s advice, some courts suggest that the 
First Amendment provides the press with some level of protection 
from liability for newsgathering torts, and support the argument 
that the First Amendment should protect against liability for the 
tort on an “anti-circumvention” theory.119  Anti-circumvention 
theory reasons that if speech is constitutionally protected, then the 
courts should also protect the means of obtaining that speech if the 
absence of protection would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the 
First Amendment.120
1. Federal Cases 
In Desnick v. American Broadcasting Company, the producer 
of ABC’s television show PrimeTime Live sent individuals manned 
with concealed cameras to the offices of Desnick Eye Center.121  
These individuals posed as patients, requested eye exams, and 
secretly videotaped two ophthalmic surgeons.122  The ABC 
implications for all of us; instead of a zone of privacy protecting our secluded 
moments, a climate of fear might surround us instead. 
Id. 
 118 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (holding that 
the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings 
was not insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news 
gathering). 
 119 See Sims, supra note 105, at 520–21. 
 120 Id. at 520–21. 
 121 44 F.3d 1345, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 122 Id. 
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producer had originally told Dr. Desnick that PrimeTime Live 
wanted to air a segment on large cataract practices.  Based on this 
information, Dr. Desnick permitted an ABC crew to film the 
Center’s main office in Chicago, to film a cataract operation “live,” 
and to interview doctors, technicians and patients.123  However, 
ABC actually produced and broadcasted a program on Medicare 
fraud involving elderly patients undergoing unnecessary cataract 
surgeries.124  The Desnick Eye Center and the two surgeons caught 
on film sued for defamation and trespass, among other torts.125  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ trespass claim even though the “test patients” gained 
access to the plaintiff’s premises by misrepresentation.126  Judge 
Posner implied that the First Amendment provides the press with 
some level of protection from liability for newsgathering torts 
when he stated that “[i]f the broadcast itself does not contain 
actionable defamation, and no established rights are invaded in the 
process of creating it . . . then the target has no legal remedy even 
if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, 
confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly.”127
2. California Cases 
California courts have also suggested that the First Amendment 
provides the press with some protection from liability for 
newsgathering torts.  In Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, the 
Court of Appeal of California held that the press’s right to seek 
information is protected so long as the journalists employ ordinary 
newsgathering techniques.128  The court stated, “the constitutional 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 1348–49. 
 125 Id. at 1349. 
 126 Id. at 1351–55. 
 127 Id. at 1355. 
 128 Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. App. 3d 509, 519 (1986).  The court 
stated that ordinary newsgathering techniques included 
asking persons questions, including those with confidential or restricted 
information.  While the government may desire to keep some proceedings 
confidential and may impose the duty upon participants to maintain 
confidentiality, it may not impose criminal or civil liability upon the press for 
obtaining and publishing newsworthy information through routine reporting 
techniques. 
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protection accorded normal news-gathering activities does not 
depend upon the characterization of the cause of action seeking to 
impose sanctions upon its exercise,” implying that the State cannot 
restrict the press’s right to gather news by creating laws that render 
ordinary newsgathering techniques tortious.129  In Anti-Defamation 
League of B’Nai B’Rith v. Superior Court of the City and County 
of San Francisco, the Court of Appeal of California held that the 
First Amendment immunized journalists from liability for violating 
a California statute imposing liability on individuals who 
intentionally disclose information, that is otherwise not public, 
which they know was obtained from personal information 
maintained by the state or federal government.130  The court stated, 
“[we] do not believe the alleged unlawfulness of petitioners’ 
information-gathering activities is dispositive of their right to the 
protection of the First Amendment,” implying that a journalist does 
not automatically lose First Amendment protection when the 
journalist commits a tort in the course of newsgathering.131
The courts have yet to come to a consensus as to how much 
protection, if any at all, should be provided to the press against 
liability for newsgathering torts.132  While some rulings indicate 
that the First Amendment provides no protection for newsgathering 
torts,133 others suggest that in certain instances the First 
Amendment will shield the press from liability.134
Id. at 519–20. 
The court also stated, “[s]ince those activities are protected by the First Amendment, state 
law may not impinge upon them by characterizing the activities as tortious.” Id. at 520. 
 129 Id. at 520. 
 130 Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith v. Super. Ct. of the City and County of 
S.F., 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (1998). 
 131 Id. at 1091.  The court indicated, however, that a journalist’s First Amendment 
protection against tort liability, when in fact applicable, only applied if the journalist was 
acting as a journalist when committing the tort.  The court stated, “[p]etitioners would be 
entitled to that protection even if they did violate the statute, but only if they obtained, 
used and disseminated the information at issue as journalists.” Id. (emphasis in the 
original). 
 132 See supra Part II. 
 133 See supra Part II.B. 
 134 See supra Part II.C. 
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III. SINGLED OUT: A THIRD APPROACH TO NEWSGATHERING TORTS 
In determining whether to hold members of the press liable for 
newsgathering torts, some courts refuse to impose liability on the 
theory that the speech protects the tort, while others impose 
liability on the grounds that the tort taints the speech.  However, 
courts should take an entirely different approach in determining 
whether to impose liability for newsgathering torts.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC 
indicates that a law imposing liability for newsgathering torts will 
not survive a constitutional challenge if the law singles out the 
press and specifically targets a limited portion of the media, unless 
that law serves a compelling state interest that may not be achieved 
in the absence of the legislation.135  Under this approach, AB 381 
would not survive a constitutional challenge. 
A. The Standard 
Judicial antipathy towards legislation that singles out the press 
and specifically targets a limited portion of the media predates 
Food Lion.  In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota 
Commissioner of Revenue, the United States Supreme Court 
overturned a Minnesota use tax on ink and paper used in 
publications.136  While the State argued that the tax was part of the 
generally applicable scheme of taxation, the Court determined that 
the tax violated the First Amendment because the tax singled out 
the press for differential treatment137 and targeted a small group of 
newspapers.138  The Court stated, “differential treatment, unless 
 135 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 136 Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 
(1983). 
 137 Id. at 581.  The Court stated, 
Minnesota . . . has not chosen to apply its general sales and use tax to 
newspapers.  Instead, it has created a special tax that applies only to certain 
publications protected by the First Amendment.  Although the State argues now 
that the tax on paper and ink is part of the general scheme of taxation, the use 
tax provision . . . is facially discriminatory, singling out publications for 
treatment that is, to our knowledge, unique in Minnesota law. 
Id. 
 138 Id. at 591–92.  The Court stated, 
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justified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that 
the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of 
expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional.”139
In Pitt News v. Pappert, the Third Circuit struck down a 
Pennsylvania law that banned advertisers from paying for alcoholic 
beverage advertisements in media affiliated with universities.140  
The court stated that although combating underage or abusive 
drinking was a compelling purpose, the State could employ means 
that would be far more direct and effective and would not infringe 
on First Amendment rights.141  The Third Circuit warned, “courts 
must be wary that taxes, regulatory laws, and other laws that 
impose financial burdens are not used to undermine freedom of the 
press and freedom of speech.”142  However, the Third Circuit, 
citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune, affirmed the understanding that 
the states and the federal government may subject the media to 
generally applicable laws without offending the Constitution.143
While not all laws that single out the press or a small group of 
speakers will ultimately be held unconstitutional, such laws are 
presumptively invalid.144  Significantly, the law need not represent 
a purposeful attempt to restrict First Amendment activities in order 
to be presumptively unconstitutional.145  Instead, the presumption 
Minnesota’s ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only because it 
singles out the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers.  
The effect of the $100,000 exemption enacted in 1974 is that only a handful of 
publishers pay any tax at all, and even fewer pay any significant amount of 
tax. . . . Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think that 
recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to 
tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a 
potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the 
scheme. 
Id. 
 139 Id. at 585. 
 140 379 F.3d 96 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
 141 Id. at 106, 108. 
 142 Id. at 110. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 111. 
 145 Id. (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 437, 448 (1991), which held that a state 
law that imposed a sales tax on cable television services while excluding and exempting 
other segments of the media was constitutional because the tax was not directed at, nor 
presented any danger of suppressing particular ideas). 
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applies if the law is “structured so as to raise suspicion” of the 
intent to impede expression protected by the First Amendment.146
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune, the United States Supreme 
Court applied the force of the First Amendment to overturn a 
facially discriminatory tax.147  The Court, however, did not limit 
its holding to tax laws, and thus created the opportunity to strike 
down other types of legislation that appeared to be facially 
discriminatory.148  While the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion did not 
use Minneapolis Star & Tribune to strike down facially 
discriminatory legislation, the Fourth Circuit did suggest that the 
First Amendment protects journalists from liability for torts 
committed during the newsgathering process if the tort in question 
singles out the press and specifically targets a portion of the 
media.149  In Food Lion, the Fourth Circuit distinguished laws of 
general applicability from laws that single out and target the 
press.150  If the decision in Food Lion were followed in California, 
the First Amendment would not shield the paparazzi from liability 
under California’s general assault law, but the First Amendment 
would provide protection against discriminatory laws such as AB 
381. 
 146 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 111; Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448. 
 147 Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 
(1983). 
 148 The Court did this by using general language which struck down as unconstitutional 
laws which singled out the press without a compelling state interest which justified the 
burden imposed on the press. Id. at 585. 
 149 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir. 1999).  
The Fourth Circuit also stated, 
[t]he key inquiry in Cowles was whether the law of promissory estoppel was a 
generally applicable law.  The Court began its analysis with some examples of 
generally applicable laws that must be obeyed by the press, such as those 
relating to copyright, labor, antitrust, and tax. . . . The torts Dale and Barnett 
committed, breach of the duty of loyalty and trespass, fit neatly into the Cowles 
framework.  Neither tort targets or singles out the press. . . . Here, as in Cowles, 
heightened scrutiny does not apply because the tort laws (breach of duty of 
loyalty and trespass) do not single out the press or have more than an incidental 
effect upon its work. 
Id. 
 150 Id. 
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B. The Standard Applied to AB 381 
Supporters of AB 381 may argue that it is a generally 
applicable law that does not apply solely to members of the press 
but would also apply to the crazed fan who chases down a celebrity 
in a car as a means to obtain that celebrity’s photograph.  However, 
the law’s disgorgement provisions provide strong support for the 
notion that AB 381 singles out the press and specifically targets the 
paparazzi.151  Certainly, in theory, a fan may sell a picture to the 
tabloids and be subject to AB 381’s disgorgement provisions as a 
consequence.  Nonetheless, California did not enact AB 381 to 
protect celebrities from such fans.152  The State enacted AB 381 to 
deter and punish those individuals who capture celebrities’ images 
purely as a means to turn a profit.153  Furthermore, the State 
tailored AB 381 to apply specifically to the actions of the 
paparazzi and not to the actions of mainstream journalists.154
According to the California Newspaper Publishers Association, 
AB 381 “makes those engaged in First Amendment protected 
activities susceptible to special penalties for which the rest of 
society is exempt.”155  Like Minnesota’s use tax on paper and ink, 
AB 381 should be considered discriminatory on its face.156  Under 
the Court’s decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, in order for a 
statute that singles out the press for differential treatment to 
survive a constitutional challenge, the State’s interest must be “of 
compelling importance that it cannot achieve” without the 
regulation.157  In other words, the regulation must satisfy the “strict 
scrutiny” standard of review.158
 151 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(d) (2006); see supra note 24. 
 152 See AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26; supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 153 AB 381 Bill Analysis, supra note 26. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See Letter from Thomas W. Newton, General Counsel, California Newpaper 
Publishers Association, to Cindy Montañez, California State Assembly, Aug. 3, 2005, 
available at http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/Letters/05-06/AB381.htm. 
 156 Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 
(1983). 
 157 Id. at 585. 
 158 See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 198, 231 (1987) (holding 
that Arkansas’ regulation that selectively applied sales tax to certain forms of 
publications was unconstitutional).  The Court stated that in order to justify differential 
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AB 381 raises a presumption of unconstitutionality because it 
singles out the press and specifically targets the paparazzi.  As the 
Third Circuit found in Pitt News, “[o]nce the presumption of 
unconstitutionality arises, it can be overcome only by showing that 
the challenged law is needed to serve a compelling interest.”159  
AB 381 threatens to chill the First Amendment.160  The threat to 
free expression outweighs any interests asserted by the State and 
other advocates to justify the law’s enactment.  AB 381 will not 
pass a strict scrutiny test because the statute does not serve a 
compelling interest that cannot be protected without the 
regulation.161  AB 381 is an unnecessary and unreasonable law 
because there is a limited market for pictures obtained through 
dangerous tactics.162  In addition, the paparazzi may be restrained 
through means that do not implicate the First Amendment because 
celebrities can rely on current assault law, which already provides 
adequate protection,163 and the tabloids can police themselves.164  
The State’s interests in protecting celebrity privacy, celebrity 
safety and public safety therefore cannot on their own justify the 
differential treatment of the paparazzi.165
treatment, “the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. 
 159 Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 111 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 160 See supra Part I.C. 
 161 See supra Part I.C; Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 585 (1983). 
 162 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 163 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 164 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 165 Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. at 586.  The Court stated, 
The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue.  
Of course that interest is critical to any government.  Standing alone, however, 
it cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of 
achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First 
Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing 
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles 
out the press. 
Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1960, Federico Fellini released his much celebrated film La 
Dolce Vita.  The word “paparazzi” derives from a character in 
Fellini’s film, a photographer named “Paparazzo.”166  In Italian, 
the word “paparazzo” means “sparrow.”167  Fellini reportedly gave 
the character this moniker because he believed that the press 
photographers who hounded celebrities looked like “little hungry 
birds.”168  Almost half a century later, a much lesser known 
director released a much less celebrated film entitled Paparazzi.169  
In Paparazzi, the main paparazzi character, Rex Harper, indicates 
that while so much has changed in the almost half century since the 
release of Fellini’s film (and over a full century since Warren and 
Brandeis’ prophetic statements), so much remains the same.170  
Harper states, “[t]he public wants raw and real and that’s what we 
give ’em. Let me tell you something, my friends, we’re the last of 
the real hunters.”171
Courts have searched for a middle ground between celebrities’ 
right to privacy and the press’s right to gather information about 
celebrities for almost as long as celebrities have existed.  While no 
members of the press, including the paparazzi, are completely 
immune from liability for torts committed in the process of 
gathering news, Food Lion indicates that tort laws that single out 
the press for differential treatment and specifically target a limited 
portion of the media will not survive a First Amendment 
challenge.172  In passing AB 381, California attempted to restrain 
the overly aggressive paparazzi.  Nonetheless, if the Ninth Circuit 
were to follow the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Food Lion, AB 381 
 166 See Internet Movie Database, Trivia for La Dolce Vita, http://www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0053779/trivia (last visited Apr. 22, 2006). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Internet Movie Data Base, Paparazzi, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338325/ (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2006). 
 170 See Internet Movie Data Base, Plot Summary for Paparazzi, http://www.imdb.com/ 
title/tt0338325/plotsummary. 
 171 See Internet Movie Data Base, Memorable Quotes From Paparazzi, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338325/quotes (last visited Apr. 22, 2006). 
 172 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 521–22 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
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would not survive a constitutional challenge, and therefore the 
State of California would have to find another way to hunt the 
hunters. 
 
